By Don McLain Gill
Lecturer, Department of International Studies, De La Salle University
China’s recent action on Sandy Cay, despite being largely symbolic, is a consistent representation of its goal to occupy as much of the West Philippine Sea as possible through salami slicing, asserts Manila-based analyst Don McLain Gill.
On 24 April, China’s state-run Global Times reported that the China Coast Guard (CCG) exercised “sovereign jurisdiction” in mid-April by seizing Sandy Cay in the West Philippine Sea or what Manila calls the part of the South China Sea encompassing its lawful 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). China’s state broadcaster CCTV also released photos of four CCG members posing with the Chinese flag on the sandbar, which the news channel described as a “vow of sovereignty”.
... occupying the sand bar would allow Beijing to justify its claims over Subi Reef and eventually serve as a stepping stone to push further into Pag-Asa Island, which houses Philippine military facilities...
However, the Philippine National Task Force on the West Philippine Sea (NTF-WPS) quickly countered Beijing’s propaganda through an Inter-Agency Maritime Operation (IAMO), which verified the situation in the area and nullified China’s sovereignty claims. This was followed by the unfurling of the Philippine flag on Sandy Cay by the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and Philippine Navy (PN) shortly after.
Along with reaffirming the Philippines’ maritime rights on Sandy Cay, the NTF-WPS reported the illegal presence of the CCG around the feature. While Beijing’s recent move was likely orchestrated for optics amid this year’s iteration of the Philippines-US Balikatan Exercises and the nearing Philippine mid-term elections, it nonetheless carries significant implications for the long-term security of the greater South China Sea.
China’s tactical moves
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Sandy Cay is classified asa rock permanently above water. This means it is entitled to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea from its banks. Sandy Cay is about two nautical miles from Pag-Asa Island, the main island in the Kalayaan municipality of the Philippines’ Palawan province. Given its geography, Sandy Cay is well within Pag-Asa Island’s 12 nautical mile territorial sea.
Sandy Cay also lies around ten nautical miles away from Subi or Zamora Reef, which China has illegally occupied and converted into a military base with an airstrip. Therefore, occupying the sand bar would allow Beijing to justify its claims over Subi Reef and eventually serve as a stepping stone to push further into Pag-Asa Island, which houses Philippine military facilities and is home to about 250 Filipino residents.
China’s expansionist designs for the Sandy Cay in the West Philippine Sea were already evident as early as 2017. When the Philippine military began to build makeshift shelters on Sandy Cay for Filipino fishermen, China vehemently contested this move by citing that the status quo over this uninhabited feature must be preserved in accordance with the non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DCOC), which was signed by ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China in 2002.
During this period, the Philippines was under former President Rodrigo Duterte, known for his appeasement towards Beijing. Consequently, when Duterte ordered the military to stop all construction activities on the sandbar, China saw this as an opportunity to further its plans to occupy more areas in the West Philippine Sea.
China’s recent action on Sandy Cay, despite being largely symbolic, is a consistent representation of its goal to occupy as much of the West Philippine Sea as possible through salami slicing.
The following period saw increased provocative activities from the CCG and the Chinese maritime militia around the sandbar. By forming a de facto barrier around Sandy Cay, China began to bar Filipino fishing boats from venturing to the sandbar. In 2019, these instruments of China’s expansionism were involved in vast swarming operations around Pag-Asa Island. This was done with the intent to eventually target Sandy Cay. Such activities were reminiscent of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, where China used similar tactics to occupy the feature within the Philippines’ lawful EEZ. Moreover, Duterte’s unwillingness to address this burgeoning security dilemma only emboldened China further.
A more active approach under the Marcos Jr era
Under the current administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, the Philippines has been pursuing a more active approach to securing its sovereignty and sovereign rights in the West Philippine Sea.
In relation to Sandy Cay, the PCG established a new outpost in Pag-Asa Island in December 2023 to better monitor the situation around the strategic vicinity. Moreover, Manila has also expanded its infrastructure development on the island to improve living conditions and strategic operations. The Philippines has also prioritised patrols around Sandy Cay. However, the situation has become more challenging with the increasing harassment by the CCG and Chinese maritime militia.
China’s recent action on Sandy Cay, despite being largely symbolic, is a consistent representation of its goal to occupy as much of the West Philippine Sea as possible through salami slicing. China’s attempt to control the Second Thomas or Ayungin Shoal eventually expanded to other parts of the West Philippine Sea, such as the Sabina or Escoda Shoal and, more recently, Pag-Asa Island and Sandy Cay. Additionally, with illegal Chinese military bases within the Philippines’ EEZ, the threat Manila faces from Beijing is existential.
... the Philippines must ensure consistency in maintaining an active presence in the vital areas of the West Philippine Sea.
Therefore, while China has not yet been able to seize and impose its total control over the Sandy Cay, the Philippines must ensure consistency in maintaining an active presence in the vital areas of the West Philippine Sea. Additionally, targeted and regular joint patrols with security partners in these zones are necessary to limit China’s unilateralism. Moreover, Manila must also continue to encourage civil society cooperation as China will continue to manipulate and exploit the information space to create public dissent in the Philippines.
Related: Philippine academic: The Philippines’ challenge facing China’s aggression | The South China Sea in 2025: More of the same, possibly worse
